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I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case

The complaint filed by Tech Landing, LLC ("Tech Landing") alleges various causes of
action. The only remaining claim alleges JLH Ventures, LLC ("JLH") negligently caused a fire
that destroyed the Appellant's building. R., 12 - 13 (,r,r32 - 36). All remaining claims were
dismissed and, by stipulation, were not included in this appeal. R., 935 - 936; 943 - 944.
B. Course of Proceedings

The complaint was filed November 9, 2017. R., 7-14. On December 5, 2017, JLH filed
its answer. R., pp. 15 - 23. Following discovery, on November 28, 2018, JLH filed a motion for
summary judgment challenging all claims in the complaint. R., 24 - 25. On December 20, 2018,
Tech Landing filed its response. R., 506 - 520. The Tech Landing response included the
declaration of attorney James Jacobson which attached, as exhibits, the expert reports of Dean
Hunt and David Cuthbirth. R., 561 -62, 7-7 - 738, 739 - 741. On December 27, 2018, JLH filed
a Motion to Strike the portions of the Jacobson declaration attempting to offer the Hunt and
Cuthbirth expert reports as evidence. R., 742 - 743; 746. On December 31, 2018, Tech Landing
responded by submitting declarations of Hunt and Cuthbirth identifying and attaching the expert
reports previously offered through the Jacobson Declaration. R., 794 - 799; 800 - 831.
On January 3, 2019, the district court heard oral arguments relating to the JLH Motion to
Strike and Motion for Summary Judgment. R., 504 - 505, 781 - 782. On February 8, 2019, the
court entered its Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment. R., 890 - 930. The same Order granted, in part, the Motion to Strike on the grounds
the opinions expressed in the Hunt and Cuthbirth Declarations were untimely. R., 891 - 892.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 3

Thereafter, the parties filed a Stipulation to Dismiss Counts I and II; R. 935 - 940. The Order of
Dismissal was entered March 4, 2019. R., 943 - 944. Final judgment was entered March 4, 2019.
R., 941. Plaintiffs Notice of Appeal was filed April 12, 2019. R., 945 - 948.

C. Statement of Facts
In April of 2013, Tech Landing leased unimproved real property from the City of Boise.
The lease included approximately 3.6 acres of land near the Boise Airport. R., 146 - 164. Tech
Landing owned the structure it placed on the City's land after the lease was signed. Its lease
required Tech Landing to remove the building upon the termination of the lease. R., p. 157
(,i8.02).
In April of 2013, Tech Landing leased the building to JLH. R., 165 - 182. During its
tenancy, JLH made some improvements to the building and, operated its paintball business. R.,
p.225 (,it 9: 14 - 22).
On August 11, 2017, a fire substantially destroyed the building. R., p. 8 (comp. ,i6). The
Boise Fire Department conducted an investigation and issued a report. R., p. 211 - 217. The fire
investigator was unable to determine the source or cause of the fire. R., p.215. In his report, the
Boise City investigator concluded the fire did not start in the laundry room and, was not caused
by the clothes dryer or washing machine located in the laundry room. R., p. 213. The expert
retained by JLH reached a similar conclusion stating the fire had not started in the laundry room,
bathroom or retail rooms. R., pp. 46, 59. Like the Boise City investigator, the JLH expert could
not identify a specific source of ignition that caused the fire. Id.
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II.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Whether Tech Landing's failure to address the applicability of res ipsa loquitur in its
opening brief constitutes a waiver of its ability to argue the district court's ruling that, under the
facts of this case, any negligence on the part of JLH cannot be established by res ipsa loquitur?
2. Whether Tech Landing has waived any argument challenging the district court's ruling
striking the opinions expressed in the declarations of Dean Hunt and David Cutbirth?
3. Whether Tech Landing has waived any argument the district court abused its discretion
by excluding specific testimony offered by Dean Hunt and David Cutbirth.
III.
ARGUMENT

A. District Court rulings that are not challenged in the appellant's opening brief
cannot be considered on appeal.

Under the Idaho Rules of Appellate Procedure, the appellant's opening brief must include
a statement of the issues presented on appeal, and an argument. See IAR 35(a)(4), (6). In the
argument section, the appellant is required to identify legal issues to be considered and provide
authorities and statutes supporting the issues it feels the court should consider. See IAR 35(a)(6).
The appellate courts will not consider any issue that is not supported by propositions of law,
authority, or argument. See Interlode Contractors Inc. v. Bryant, 132 Idaho 443, 974 P.2d 89
(Ct. App. 1999); Weaver v. Suri Bros., 129 Idaho 497, 927 P.2d 887 (1996); Taylor v.

Browning, 129 Idaho 483, 927 P.2d 873 (1996). The failure to raise legal issues in the opening
brief will preclude the appellate courts from addressing those matters. See Sun Valley Shopping

Center, Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 803 P.2d 993 (1991); U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n v.
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 5

Kuenzli, 134 Idaho 222, 999 P.2d 877 (2000). Finally, the appellate courts will not consider

arguments raised for the first time in the appellant's reply brief. State v. Klingler, 126 Idaho 737,
890 P.2d 323 (1995); Thomas v. Medical Center Physicians, P.A., 138 Idaho 200, 61 P.3d 557
(2002).
1. Liability cannot be established by res ipsa loquitur.

The district court's order granting summary judgment concluded the doctrine of res ipsa

loquitur could not be utilized to establish a breach of duty or, legal causation on the part of JLH.
See R., pp. 910 - 911. Citing Jerome Thriftway Drug, Inc. v. Winslow, 110 Idaho 615, 717 P.2d

1033 (1986), the court ruled JLH was entitled to summary judgment because the plaintiff could
not "prove an instrumentality in the control of the defendant caused the fire." See R., p.910.
Tech Landing has failed to address this ruling in its opening memorandum. For that
reason, the district court's ruling that res ipsa loquitur cannot be utilized to establish JLH was
negligent, must be affinned.

2. Opinions stated in the declarations of Dean Hunt and David Cuthbirth cannot be
considered on appeal.
Tech Landing initially responded to the JLH Motion for Summary Judgment by offering
the declaration of attorney James Jacobson. See R., pp. 561 - 562. The Jacobson Declaration
attached the Hunt and Cutbirth reports. R., 707 - 738; 739 - 741. JLH moved to strike those
reports as Mr. Jacobson lacks personal knowledge of their contents and the reports offered
through the attorney's affidavit were inadmissible hearsay evidence. R., p.742 - 748. Thereafter,
Tech Landing filed declarations of Hunt and Cutbirth identifying and attaching the same reports
previously offered through the Jacobson Declaration. R., pp. 794 - 799; 800 - 831. JLH objected
on the grounds the new declarations were untimely.
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The district court allowed the Hunt and Cutbirth declarations to the extent the declaration
testimony was utilized to authenticate the witnesses reports. See R., pp.892 and 893. The
remaining testimony in both the Hunt and Cutbirth declarations was stricken as being untimely.
Id.

Appellant's opening brief fails to address this aspect of the district court's order. For that
reason, any argument challenging the district court's decision has been waived. Accordingly, all
opinion testimony contained in the declarations of Mr. Cutbirth, R., p.893, or Hunt, R., p.892,
cannot be considered in this appeal.
3. Tech Landing has waived any argument the district court abused its discretion

In its opening brief, Tech Landing generally argues the district court abused its discretion
by excluding portions of the testimony of Mr. Cutbirth that attempted to address the cause of the
fire and, how JLH was responsible. Lacking in its briefing is any discussion concerning the legal
standard required to establish an abuse of discretion occurred. In State v. Kralovec, 161 Idaho
569, 388 P.3d 583 (2017), this court recognized the appellant, who was challenging the trial
court's evidentiary rulings, had failed to explain how the district court had abused its discretion.
This caused the court to write:
We note that this Court has seen an increasing number of cases
where a party completely fails to address the factors we consider
when evaluating a claimed abuse of discretion. We emphasize that
when a party "does not contend that the district court failed to
perceive the issue as one of discretion, that the district court failed
to act within the boundaries of this discretion and consistent with
the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it
or that the district court did not reach its decision by an exercise of
reason," such a conclusory argument is "facially deficient" to the
party's case. Cummings v. Stephens, 160 Idaho 849, 855, 380 P.3d
168, 174 (2016). "We will not consider arguments of error not
supported by argument and authority in the opening brief." Id.
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See 161 Idaho at 575, note 2.
In this case Tech Landing has, like the appellant in State v. Kralovec, failed to describe
how the district court failed to perceive the evidentiary issues it confronted as one of discretion
or, how it failed to act within the boundaries of that discretion. While Tech Landing may
disagree with the trial court's legal rulings on evidentiary foundation issues, it was required to
explain how those rulings would be considered an abuse of the court's discretion. Accordingly,
any argument the trial court abused its discretion in connection with the evidentiary rulings
surrounding the opinions offered by Mr. Cutbirth have been waived as those issues were not
addressed in the Appellant's opening brief.
B. The District Court did not abuse its discretion by excluding specific testimony of
the Appellant's retained experts

Tech Landing argues the district court abused its discretion by excluding testimony from
its expert witnesses regarding causation. Notably, as outlined in §III.A.3, above, its argument
fails to describe how the court's rulings did not meet the abuse of discretion standard previously
articulated by this court. See Athay v. Stacey, 142 Idaho 360, 366, 128 P.3d 897, 903 (2005)
(outlining the three part test for abuse of discretion). Appellant's failure to address these issues in
its opening brief constitutes a waiver and, precludes it from raising those issues in its reply. See
§III, A.3, supra. As outlined below, the district court acted within its discretion and correctly
excluded inadmissible testimony offered by the appellant's expert witnesses.
Appellant's actual argument is much narrower than the general issue of whether the
District Court abused its discretion. For instance, Tech Landing does not argue the trial court
failed to correctly perceive the issue as one of discretion, or that the trial court did not reach its
decision by an exercise of reason. Rather, Tech Landing complains that "[t]he District Court
rules that Appellant's expert witness testimony from Dean Hunt and David Cutbirth regarding
RESPONDENT' S BRIEF - 8

causation was inadmissible because it was not based on specialized knowledge." Appellant's
Brief, p. 13. Consequently, it argues, "[t]he District Court erred in excluding the testimony as it

failed to recognize and apply the appropriate test." Id. Tech Landing is wrong as the District
Court appropriately ruled that certain aspects of the testimony from Messrs. Hunt and Cutbirth
were inadmissible.
1.

Legal Standard For Admission of Expert Testimony.

This Court has previously explained that affidavits supporting or opposing motions for
summary judgment must set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Gem State Ins.
Co. v. Hutchison, 145 Idaho 10, 13, 175 P .3d 172, 175 (2007). Thus:

The admissibility of the evidence contained in affidavits and
depositions in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary
judgment is a threshold question to be answered before applying
the liberal construction and reasonable inferences rule to determine
whether the evidence is sufficient to create a genuine issue for trial.
Id.

A district court has broad discretion in determining whether a witness is qualified as an
expert; and the admission of opinion testimony, whether that of an expert or a lay witness, is a
matter committed to the trial court's discretion. Hull v. Giesler, 163 Idaho 247, 250, 409 P.3d
827, 830 (2018). Such decisions will only be overturned if the appellant shows an abuse of
discretion. Id.
The general requirements for expert testimony are given by outlined at Rule 702 of the
Idaho Rules of Evidence, which states:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an
opinion or otherwise if the expert's scientific, technical, or other
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specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue.

Rule 703, I.R.E., also provides, in part:
An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the
expert has been made aware of or personally observed. If experts
in the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts
or data in forming an opinion or inference on the subject, they need
not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted ... .
The District Court acknowledged the application of I.R.E. 702 and 703 when it made is
decision. See R. 893.
2.

The Experts' Declarations Were Correctly Excluded.

As an initial matter, the District Court did not exclude all of Messrs. Hunt's and
Cutbirth's testimony. After JLH filed its Motion for Summary Judgment, Tech Landing
submitted two affidavits in opposition, including an affidavit from Appellant's counsel to which
he had attached the expert reports from Mr. Hunt and Mr. Cutbirth. See R. 561-562. JLH
objected to these reports in its Reply Brief (see R. 775-776) and separately moved to strike the
expert reports on the grounds that Appellant's counsel could not provide the evidentiary
foundation for the document and that the reports were hearsay. R. 742 - 746. After the Reply

Brief and Motion to Strike were filed, Appellant filed untimely declarations from David Cutbirth
and Dean Hunt. R. 794-795 and 800-802. These declarations not only authenticated the
respective reports, but also restated the testimony of Messrs. Hunt and Cutbirth. See R. 795
(Cutbirth's opinions) and R. 801
at the hearing. See R. 891.
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,r 4

,r 5 (Hunt's opinions). JLH objected to these new declarations

The District Court ruled the declarations of Mr. Hunt and Mr. Cutbirth were, in fact,
untimely under Rule 56. 1 R. 892. An affidavit in opposition to a motion for summary judgment
may be struck because it was not timely filed. Arregui v. Gallegos-Mai11, 153 Idaho 801, 805,
291 P.3d 1000, 1004 (2012). Nevertheless, the District Court threw Appellant a bone, so to
speak, as it did not strike the declarations in their entirety. Instead, the District Court held that it
would "consider Mr. Hunt's declaration testimony only to the extent that it authenticates his
report and will consider his CV." R. 892. The District Court similarly indicated it would consider
Mr. Cutbirth's declaration "in so far as it authenticates his report." R. 892-893.
The District Court would have acted within its discretion by striking the declarations in
their entirety-and, indeed, should have done so under the provisions of Rule 56-but
nevertheless permitted the experts' testimony via their reports. Since the expert reports were
required to contain a "complete statement of all opinions to be expressed and the basis and
reasons for the opinions," Tech Landing was not prejudiced by the District Court ruling which
allowing testimony via the reports. I.R.C.D. 26(4)(A)(i). Consequently, the District Court did
not err when it struck the remainder of Mr. Hunt's and Mr. Cutbirth's declarations.
3.

The District Court Correctly Held That Mr. Hunt's Opinions Did Not
Extend To The Cause Of The Fire

Tech Landing argues the District Court inappropriately excluded Mr. Hunt's expert
testimony on causation. Specifically, Appellant complains "[t]he District Court determined that
only Mr. Hunt's opinion that the fire originated in the laundry room was reached to the degree of
certainty accepted within the field of fire science, and that his opinion regarding the dryer being
the probable cause was merely speculation." Appellant's Brief, p. 15. Contrary to this argument
the District Court's ruling did not arise in a vacuum, but comes from Mr. Hunt's own statements.
1

That ruling is not challenged in Appellant's opening brief. See §111.A.2.
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The very portion of Mr. Hunt's report cited by Tech Landing admits Mr. Hunt could not
opine on the source of the fire. He generally states that "(t]his fire originated in the laundry room
located in the northeast comer of the structure." Appellant's Brief, p. 15 (quoting from R. 814).
He then goes on to state:
The probable cause of this fire is the dryer in the laundry room that
had been left running prior to the fire. The cause of this fire is
undetermined pending an evaluation by an electrical engineer.
R. 814 (emphasis added); see also Appellant's Brief, p. 15; R. 806 (again concluding that

"[t]he cause of this fire is undetermined pending an evaluation by an electrical engineer"). Mr.
Hunt concluded that "[t]he specific ignition sequence was not identified." R. 806. In short, Mr.
Hunt was very clear that "the cause of the fire was undetermined" by himself and, the only
opinion he could offer was that the fire started in the laundry room. 2
The District Court recognized this distinction, writing "Mr. Hunt says his opinion that the
fire originated in the laundry room was reached to the degree of certainty accepted within the
field of fire sciences." R. 894. The District Court even acceded that Mr. Hunt's "observations
certainly support a conclusion the fire originated in the vicinity of the back of the dryer." Id. But,
as the District Court recognized, "there is an important distinction between where a fire started
and how a fire started." Id. The Court explained that, in this case, "Mr. Hunt's statement that the
probable cause of the fire was the dryer does not appear to be based on specialized knowledge,"
but was simply a "logical deduction" based on the dryer being in the room where Hunt believed
the fire started (contrary to what the other two fire inspectors determined). According to Mr.

2

It should be noted that JLH's retained a fire investigator, Dennis Zigrang, who determined that
the fire could not have originated in the laundry room or because of the dryer. R. 46, ,i 3. It is
also notable that the Boise Fire Department investigated the cause of the fire and concluded that
the fire had not started in the laundry room and was not caused by the washing machine or dryer.
R. 213, LI. I 09-115.
RESPONDENT' S BRIEF - 12

Hunt, the fire appeared to have started near the back of the dryer which was (according to Hunt)
operating at the time the fire started. Additionally, he was told that the back of the dryer had not
been removed. R. 894-895.
Again, this is made clear from Mr. Hunt's report. His analysis was limited to a single
paragraph and began: "This fire originated in the laundry room located in the northeast comer of
the structure. This determination was based on the observed patterns of fire damage, witness
statements, and a systematic evaluation of the remaining physical evidence and with a reasonable
degree of fire science certainty." R. 814 (underline added). Thus, the only opinion he offered
"with a reasonable degree of fire science certainty" was limited to determining in which room
the fire started. He did not offer a similar opinion regarding the cause of the fire.
This is reinforced in the remaining two sentences of Mr. Hunt's analysis where he wrote:
"The probable cause of this fire is the dryer in the laundry room that had been left running prior
to the fire. The cause of this fire is undetermined pending an evaluation by an electrical
engineer." R. 814 (underline added). Thus, not only does Mr. Hunt not apply the same
"reasonable degree of fire science certainty" to whether the dryer was the source of the fire, but
he specifically indicated that he could not determine the fire's cause.
In any event, the District Court correctly held that the admissibility of the expert
testimony of a fire origin expert was governed by I.R.E. 702. Camell v. Barker Mgmt., Inc., 137
Idaho 322, 328, 48 P.3d 651, 657 (2002). While the Court held that Hunt employed scientific or
specialized knowledge in rendering an opinion as to the fire originating in the laundry room, the
Court correctly observed that the same was not true as to his statement that the fire likely started
in the dryer. R. 895. Rather, per Mr. Hunt's opinion, we must tum to the findings of the electrical
engineer, Mr. Cutbirth.
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4.

The District Court Correctly Excluded Portions of Mr. Cutbirth's Testimony

Mr. Cutbirth purports to be an electrical engineer who has provided expert opinions "on
several fire investigations that are initially determined to be electrical in nature." R. 797. The
District Court accepted that Mr. Cutbirth could provide an opinion as to whether the fire was the
result of an electrical fault. R. 896.
In his report, Mr. Cutbirth states that "[b ]ased on my review of information received, it is
my professional opinion that the fire was not caused by an electrical fault either within the drier
[sic] or the wiring feeding the drier [sic]." R. 797-798. He goes on to note his reasoning
explaining why there was no fault in the dryer causing the fire, and that "a fault within a specific
piece of equipment (dryer) was not a likely cause." R. 799. Finally, he again states that "[i]n my
professional opinion as an electrical engineer, it does not appear the probable cause was due to
an electrical fault." Id. The District Court found this opinion to be admissible. R. 896. Thus,
when combined with Mr. Hunt's report indicating that his (Hunt's) conclusions regarding the
dryer depended on the findings of the electrical engineer, it becomes clear that the dryer was not
the cause of the fire.
The District Court, rejected Cutbirth's further opinion as to the cause of the fire because
he stepped outside his expertise and opined that the fire was caused by combustion in a dryer
vent. R. 897. More specifically, Cutbirth wrote "[i]t is my opinion that the fire was caused by
combustion within the drier [sic] vent at or near the PVC piping that was utilized as an extension
of a 'short' piece of drier [sic] venting to the outside wall exhaust." R. 797-798. His conclusion
was based on his understanding that PVC has a maximum operating temperature of 140°
Fahrenheit, and that "[t]he dryer discharge temperatures may be as [sic] 155 degrees Fon high."
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R. 798. Cutbirth also noted that "PVC is prone for creating static electricity when moving air,

which is also a [sic] likely to cause a buildup of lint." Id.
The District Court was willing to accept, with reservations, Mr. Cutbirth's opinion as to
static causing a buildup of lint. R. 897. However, the Court noted that Cutbirth had not provided
any basis for his statement that the "maximum operating temperature" of PVC was 140° or his
definition of "maximum operating temperature." Id. The District Court also noted that the
statement that dryer discharge temperatures could be as high as 155 ° was also without
foundation and ambiguous. As the District Court correctly pointed out:
Does this mean every dryer? Dryers on average? This particular
make and model of dryer? This particular dryer? Is that the upper
limit for dryer output temperature set by the government or some
other regulatory body? Is the maximum output temperature of
every dryer ever manufactured common knowledge in the field of
electrical engineering? If not, where does that figure come from?
R. 897-898. Additionally, the District Court noted that there was nothing in the report to show

that the particular dryer involved was capable of producing air of that temperature when set on
high, or that the dryer had been set on high, or that the temperature indicated by Mr. Cutbirth
was sufficient to cause combustion. R. 898 and 899. Finally, the District Court was troubled by
the fact that "Mr. Cutbirth offers no explanation for how this caused or even could have caused a
fire." R. 898. The District Court examined many of the problems with Mr. Cutbirth's opinion
and concluded:
Mr. Cutbirth's report does not contain many of the things the Court
expects to see in an expert report explaining an opinion about how
a fire started: What was the first fuel source? What was the likely
ignition source? Why did ignition happen in that way? How is it
plausible that ignition occurred in that way?
R. 899-900. Applying I.R.E. 702, the District Court noted that the sum of Cutbirth's testimony

was that "if the fire started behind the dryer or in the dryer and it wasn't due to some electrical
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 15

fault, it must have been something else and the only other apparent explanation is static
electricity on the PVC pipe." R. 900. Thus the District Court found that "Mr. Cuthbirth's [sic]
opinion is simply an argument about an inference Plaintiff would like the jury to draw," and
"does not rely on any knowledge outside the realm of common experience for most jurors and it
will not assist them in deciding how the fire started, largely because it doesn't offer any
explanation for how the fire started." Id. The district court clearly recognized it possessed
discretion to strike portions of the expert testimony of Mr. Cutbirth. See Zylstra v. State, 157
Idaho 457,466 - 467, 337 P.3d 616, 625 - 626 (2014). It also acted within the boundaries of that
discretion and, as explained in its Memorandum Opinion, R. 890 - 900, 903 - 910, reached its
conclusions through an exercise of reason. As outlined above,~ §111.A.3, whether or how the
district court abused its discretion was not addressed in the Appellant's opening brief and, cannot
be considered on appeal.
The fact Mr. Cutbirth's opinion assumes the existence of many of the facts the District
Court found Tech Landing had not established by admissible evidence, demonstrates his
opinions concerning where and how the fire started were based upon impermissible speculation.

It also reveals Tech Landing is relying upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as there is no
evidence in this record establishing where or how the fire started. Any attempt by Mr. Cutbirth to
rely upon factual presumptions created through res ipsa loquitur cannot be accepted for the
reasons outlined in Jerome Thriftway Drug, Inc. v. Winslow, 110 Idaho 615, 717 P.2d 1033
(1986). Additionally, this issue has been waived by the fact Tech Landing did not address the
district court's ruling that res ipsa loquitur was not, under the facts of this case, available to
establish JLH was negligent or its negligence was the proximate cause of the fire. See §III.A.I .
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The District Court correctly rejected Mr. Cutbirth's second opinion under I.R.E. 702
because electrical experts are not fire origin experts. Carnell v. Barker Mgmt., Inc., 137 Idaho
322, 327-28, 48 P.3d 651, 656-57 (2002). In Camell, the plaintiffs sought to use the opinion of
an electrician, Bidstrup, to show the cause and spread of a house fire. This Court found the
district court correctly rejected Bidstrup's testimony because there was no information in his
affidavit concerning his education, training and experience in fire causation or how he
supposedly had gained knowledge of fire causation. Camell v. Barker Mgmt., Inc., 137 Idaho at
328, 48 P.3d at 657. The Court also agreed that the electrician's fire causation opinions were
properly excluded under Rule 702 because, other than a fact of common knowledge (fire burned
toward fuel or oxygen), "there was no other explanation of the methodology Bidstrup used to
determine the cause of the fire or exclude possible causes." Id. Finally, the Court agreed that the
electricians testimony was correctly excluded because it lacked a factual foundation. Id.
Such is the case here. Although Mr. Cutbirth was qualified to render an opinion there was
no electrical fault with the dryer, there was no evidence he was qualified by either training or
experience to opine on fire causation generally. He did not describe his methodology at arriving
at his conclusion that the fire originated in a dryer vent, other than saying that dryer lint could
build up in a dryer vent. Similar to the electrician in Carnell, Mr. Cutbirth's opinions lack factual
foundation. As the District Court noted, Cutbirth states an operating temperature for PVC, but
doesn't provide any information as to ignition temperature, or whether the dryer reached (let
alone was capable of reaching) that ignition temperature.

It is also notable there was evidence there was no lint in the PVC tubing. JLH's fire
expert, Dennis Zigrang, provided a rebuttal report which set out information he had learned from
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Lael Haile, one of the owners of JLH. See R. 87. Mr. Zigrang related he had interviewed Ms.
Haile on October 17, 2018, and learned the following:
She stated that one to one and a half years prior to the fire, they
had moved an old parts cleaning station, [sic] that they were no
longer using, from the southeast corner of the laundry room. This
gave her access to vent the hose [sic] for the dryer. She removed
the vent hose to clean it and found some sand in the hose but little
to no lint. She said the lint traps never had much lint in them
because they primarily used the laundry room to dry microfiber
cloths.
Id. (emphasis added) Thus, there is no evidence that lint even had built up in the vent hose or
PVC pipe as hypothesized by Mr. Cutbirth. 3
In conclusion, Mr. Cutbirth was not qualified to render an opinion that the fire originated
in a PVC pipe attached to the vent hose, and his opinions were purely speculative and of no
assistance to a jury. Accordingly, the District Court properly rejected his opinion as to the cause
of the fire per I.R.E. 702.
5.

Appellant's Were Reguired To Show Evidence Of Causation.

Tech Landing attempts to avoid the shortcomings in its arguments by arguing its experts
were not required to establish causation. Specifically, Appellant argues that "[e]xperts who opine
on probable cause in negligence actions are not required to set forth the specific cause or a
specific ignition sequence; it is sufficient for them to opine as to a reasonable likely cause, and
fact witnesses or other experts, can fill in the details. Appellant's Brief, p. 19 (citing Nield v.
Pocatello Health Services, Inc., 156 Idaho 802, 332 P.3d 14 (2012), Lantham v. Idaho Power
Co., 130 Idaho 486, 492-93, 943 P.2d 912, 918-919 (1997), Weeks v. Eastem Idaho Health
Services, 143 Idaho 834, 153 P.3d 1180 (2007)). Appellant is mistaken.

3

Testimony surrounding cleaning the vent pipe by Lael Haile was also provided by Jeremy Haile
during his deposition. R. 456 - 457.
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 18

As noted above, Appellant has dismissed all claims against JLH except for a claim that
the fire was the result of JLH's negligence. The elements of a common law negligence claim are
(1) a duty, recognized by law, requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of
conduct; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and
the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage. Griffith v. Jump Time Meridian, LLC, 161
Idaho 913, 915, 393 P.3d 573, 575 (2017). On a motion for summary judgment, this Court has
explained that the moving party bears the burden of proving the absence of a material fact on
issues establishing the prima facie elements of the plaintiffs case. Haight v. Idaho Dep't of
Transportation, 163 Idaho 383, 387, 414 P.3d 205, 209 (2018). "If the moving party has

satisfied its burden, the non-moving party must then come forward with sufficient admissible
evidence identifying specific facts that demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue for trial." Id.
Assuming for sake of argument that the duty element is established, JLH offered the
report of its fire expert, Dennis Zigrang, who determined the fire could not have originated in the
laundry room or, because of the dryer. R. 46,

1 3.

It is notable the Boise Fire Department

investigated the cause of the fire concluding the fire had not started in the laundry room and was
not caused by the washing machine or dryer. R. 213, LL 109-115. In short, through the opinions
of its retained expert coupled with the findings of the Boise City fire inspector, JLH established
there was no evidence of a breach of a duty, or a causal connection between JLH's conduct and
the resulting fire. Thus, the burden shifted to Tech Landing "to come forward with sufficient
admissible evidence identifying specific facts that demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue
for trial." This Tech Landing failed to do.
The cases cited by Tech Landing do not assist its argument. Nield v. Pocatello Health
Servs., Inc., 156 Idaho 802, 332 P.3d 14 (2012), was a medical malpractice case where the
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patient contracted methicillin-resistant staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) after being admitted to
the Pocatello Care and Rehabilitation Center (PCRC). Nield claimed her infections were the
result of negligent wound care and unsanitary conditions at the facility. See 156 Idaho at 805.
PCRC moved for summary judgment based on a doctor's affidavit who opined Nield had
contracted MRSA prior to admission. Nield countered with affidavits from three experts: a
nursing facility expert, a nursing care expert, and a medical doctor. All three attributed Nield's
infection to poor infection control measures by the hospital staff. See 156 Idaho at 807. The
reports detailed how MRSA was typically contracted, explained specific shortcomings by the
nursing staff, and stated there was no medical evidence that Nield had been infected with MRSA
before entering the facility. It was suggested the PCRC had other documented instances where its
infection control measures were found to be substandard, and that 4 or 5 other patients in the
rooms around Nield had also been diagnosed with MRSA. See 156 Idaho at 808. The district
court struck the affidavit of Nield's medical expert based solely on its erroneous determination
the expert was required to counter the various possibilities suggested by an opposing expert, but
had failed to do so. See 156 Idaho at 811.
In this case, the District Court did not strike Mr. Hunt's and Mr. Cutbirth's testimony
because they failed to dispute Mr. Zigrang's opinions concerning the location and causation of
the fire. Rather, the Court noted Mr. Hunt failed to provide an opinion as to causation, and that
Mr. Cutbirth's testimony was inadmissible to the extent that he believed the fire started in a
section of the venting for the dryer.
Lantham v. Idaho Power Co., 130 Idaho 486, 943 P.2d 912 (1997) is similarly
unavailing. Although the issue in the case was the cause of a fire-specifically, whether a brush
fire was caused by a downed power line or some other cause-the issue addressed by the
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Supreme Court was whether the expert could testify there was insufficient evidence to determine

'
the cause of a fire. On appeal, this Court held an expert could testify as to other possible causes
based on eye witness reports and lightning strike data, and that none of them could be ruled out.
While the case could be cited to support the admission of Mr. Zigrang's opinions, it does not
help Tech Landing. There were no witnesses or evidence addressing the location of where the
fire broke out in the building. The defect with Mr. Cutbirth's testimony was the lack of data or
explanation to support what were inadmissible speculation and conclusions. Mr. Hunt offered no
opinion on the cause of the fire, relying instead on whatever Mr. Cutbirth would later conclude.
Weeks v. Eastern Idaho Health Services, 143 Idaho 834, 153 P.3d 1180 (2007), also cuts

against Tech Landing's argument. In that case, medications intended to be delivered to the
plaintiff via an intravenous line were instead attached to a catheter intended to drain fluid from
her brain. At summary judgment, the district court refused to admit the expert opinions of the
plaintiffs expert, Dr. Edward Smith, on the grounds that he was not competent to testify as to the
effect of the nursing error. Id., 143 Idaho at 836, 153 P.3d at 1182. The district court apparent} y
had used a Daubert analysis and rejected Dr. Smith's testimony because:
In this case Dr. Smith testified that the infusion was a substantial
factor in causing Evelyn's death to a reasonable medical
probability, but he was unable to determine the exact effect of the
medication on Evelyn's brain. He testified that the mechanical
aspect of fluid buildup could not be separated from the chemical
aspect of the composition of the fluid, and he was not certain
whether the chemicals themselves, the volume of fluid, or the
combination of the two caused her death. Dr. Smith stated that it
was impossible to tell the exact hydrodynamic, autoimmune, and
biochemical effects of the infusion because that would require a
series of controlled experiments or laboratory studies which would
never be performed.

4

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593- 95 (1993).
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Weeks, 143 Idaho at 839. This Court held the district court had erred because (i) the Court had

never adopted Daubert's requirement that a theory must be commonly agreed upon or generally
accepted, and (ii) "Dr. Smith was clear that infusion of this volume of fluid, whether over an
eight hour period or a period of a few minutes, would cause a deleterious effect 'just from the
fact of fluid going in when it should be going out.' This is not speculation and is based on more
than a temporal concurrence." See 143 Idaho at 839.
In this case, the District Court did not apply Daubert or require that Mr. Hunt or Mr.
Cutbirth present peer reviewed research supporting their specific conclusions. Nevertheless, as
this Court has held, "[ w]hen an 'expert's opinion is based upon scientific knowledge, there must
likewise be a scientific basis for that opinion' because if the reasoning or methodology
underlying the opinion is not scientifically sound, then the opinions would not assist a trier of
fact." Weeks, 143 Idaho at 838, 153 P.3d at 1184 (quoting Swallow v. Emerge11cy Med. of
Idaho, P.A., 138 Idaho 589, 592, 67 P.3d 68, 71 (2003)). The issue here is the fact Mr. Hunt did

not opine that the fire was caused by the dryer, nor did he suggest JLH was negligent.
Additionally, Mr. Cutbirth's second opinion concerning the PVC tube being the source of the fire
was not supported by training, experience, or any scientific basis. Perhaps more important, it
relied upon the unsupported supposition that lint had built up in the PVC tube and ignored the
undisputed fact Lael Haile had, before the fire, cleaned the pipe and, had not found any lint
collecting within it. 5 See R. 456 - 457; R. 87. Thus, Mr. Cutbirth's opinions were not based
upon facts and were properly rejected as speculative.

As reported by Ms. Haile, the lint traps on the dryer never collected much lint as the dryer was
used to launder microfiber cloths. For that reason, when she removed the vent hose to clean it
she found some sand in the hose but little to no lint. R., 87.

5
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In any event, this Court has previously rejected the notion that liability for negligently
starting a fire could be imposed absent evidence as to the cause of the fire. In Jerome Thriftway
Drug, Inc. v. Winslow, 110 Idaho 615,717 P.2d 1033 (1986), the court was presented with an

analogous situation. The defendants leased a portion of a building which they operated as a
department store. On December 11, 1981, a fire destroyed the structure. The local fire chief, after
his investigation, believed the fire was electrical in origin based on the age of the building. Id.,
110 Idaho at 616. The state fire investigator believed that the fire had started in an office at the
rear of the department store near or at an electrical outlet. Id. However, fire investigators could
not determine a specific point of origin. See 110 Idaho at 618. Neither the tenants nor the
landlord were aware of any electrical problems, and the no definite cause of the fire had been
established. See 110 Idaho at 617. The court reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of
the landlord ruling that the evidence did not support a finding that the tenants were at fault, either
expressly or implicitly. See 110 Idaho at 617-18. The court rejected an argument based on
negligence per se because there was no evidence of code violations. See 110 Idaho at 618. The
court also held the cause of the fire could not be established by application of the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur because "the 'instrumentality causing the injury' was not established and in fact no

instrumentality could be identified as having caused the fire." See 110 Idaho at 618. Thus, the
court concluded "there is no justification for the conclusion that negligence is the most likely
explanation for this fire because there was no showing of the instrumentality that caused the
damage, much less any showing of exclusive control." See, 110 Idaho at 619.
In Western Stockgrowers Ass'n v. Edwards, 126 Idaho 939, 894 P.2d 172 (1995), this
Court held that mere proximity of the defendant's vehicle to the source of a grass fire did not
establish the vehicle started the fire or that the driver had been negligent. In that case, the
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plaintiff alleged the defendant had started a fire by driving over an unimproved road. Their
theory of the case was that the heat of the exhaust pipe ignited the sage brush. See 126 Idaho at
942. The district court rejected the argument that the mere presence of the defendant's vehicle in
the area of the fire was sufficient to show negligence, explaining:
There was no evidence to show that the operation of the jeep prior
to the fire was inappropriate. There was no evidence of prior
knowledge of mechanical defect. There was no evidence of closure
of the road, and it was not unusual for traffic to be on that road on
the date in question. There was no evidence that there was a jeep
malfunction or equipment failure on the date in question .... there is
no direct evidence as to what the conduct was which started the
fire, no observation of negligent operation, no observation or
testimony concerning being out, with knowledge, in a closed area,
a fire danger, no evidence that the operation of the jeep was
anything other than on the Indian Springs Road ....
Id. The Court of Appeals agreed, stating: "[T]here was no substantial evidence upon which a
jury could find the conduct of Edwards to be a breach of any duty owed, without engaging in
speculation." Id.
Similarly, in this case, Tech Landing has failed to show that the operation of the dryer
was inappropriate. There is no evidence of mechanical or electrical defect. Mr. Cutbirth
concluded that, in his opinion as an electrical engineer, there was no electrical issues that could
have started the fire. There is no evidence that lint had built up on the tubes used for ventilation,
~

R. 87, 456 - 457 let alone that it caused the fire. There is no evidence that PVC tube had

ignited or released flammable gases. In short, there was no evidence as to what caused the fire,
let alone that the fire was due to the negligence of JLH. The Boise City fire investigator and the
defendant's retained expert correctly opined the cause of the fire could not be determined. R.
215, R.46, 59. Those opinions were not rebutted with admissible evidence which caused the
District Court to grant summary judgment.
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In short, the District Court did not err in detennining that Mr. Hunt had not expressed an
admissible opinion as to cause of the fire. Additionally, the Court did not err in detennining that
Mr. Cutbirth's testimony concerning the cause of the fire did not meet the threshold for
admissibility under I.R.E. 702. For these reasons, the Court should uphold the decision of the
District Court.
THE DISTRICT COURT ACTED CORRECTLY BY GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT TO JLH

As discussed above, on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party bears the
burden of proving the absence of a material fact. Haight v. Idaho Dep't of Transportation, 163
Idaho 383,387,414 P.3d 205, 209 (2018). "If the moving party has satisfied its burden, the nonmoving party must then come forward with sufficient admissible evidence identifying specific
facts that demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue for trial." Id.
This case arises out of an August 11, 2017, fire which destroyed a building owned by
Tech Landing of which a portion had been leased to JLH. Tech Landing's claims are not based
upon strict liability or imputed fault. Instead, it alleges the "fire was substantially caused by
Defendant's negligent care/maintenance," including, "failure to clean and maintain the ... dryer
unit[ ]". R., 8 (17) and 12 (134).
In support of its motion for summary judgment, JLH submitted reports from the Boise
Fire Department's fire investigation as well as its own investigator. R., 45 - 88, 211 - 217. The
Boise Fire Department's investigator concluded the cause of fire and even the source could not
be detennined, although he was able to rule out the laundry room, including the clothes dryer, as
a source. R., 213. JLH's fire expert, Dennis Zigrang concurred. R., 58 - 59; 87. In other words,
the experts relied on by JLH concluded there was no evidence to link to the fire to any act or
failure to act by JLH or its agents.
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To avoid summary judgment, it was not enough for Tech Landing to show the fire
occurred in the portion of the building leased to JLH or even in equipment used by JLH. Instead
it had to provide evidence the fire was caused by something JLH had done or failed to do which
was, itself, a breach of a legal duty. Necessarily, Tech Landing's experts had to establish the
cause of the fire and JLH's involvement.
Tech Landing responded with Mr. Hunt's testimony that, as explained in more detail
above, presented an expert opinion that the fire had started in the laundry room, but stopped short
of concluding the dryer was the cause of the fire. R., 84. Instead he deferred to Mr. Cutbirth's
factual conclusions as whether there was an electrical fault in the dryer. Mr. Cutbirth opined that
there was no electrical issues with the dryer that caused the fire. R. 797 - 798. However, he then
went on, without any scientific, technical, or factual basis, to suggest the fire started in a PVC
tube connected to a vent hose which was, in tum, connected to the dryer. Id. The Court properly
determined that Mr. Cutbirth's factually unsupported theory of how the fire started was
inadmissible under I.R.E. 702 as Mr. Hunt had not offered an opinion regarding the cause of the
fire. R., 898 - 900. Thus, because Tech Landing had not rebutted the assertion that the fire was
not caused by JLH, the Court correctly granted summary judgment. See Zylstra v. State, 157
Idaho 457, 465, 337 P.3d 616, 624 (2014) (District Court granted summary judgment where
plaintiffs expert witness testimony was stricken and for that reason, the plaintiff failed to
establish a causal connection between the defendant's actions and plaintiffs injuries.)
It is notable that even if Mr. Cutbirth's factually unsupported hypothesis that the fire
started in the PVC pipe were accepted, it does not establish that the JLH had acted negligently.
As noted, there is no evidence of mechanical or electrical issues with the dryer. There is no
evidence that there was a buildup of lint in the tube. There is no evidence that JLH acted
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improperly in operating the dryer. Thus, again, the District Court correctly granted the JLH
motion for summary judgment.
IV.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons, outlined above, the district court's ruling granting the JLH motion for
summary judgment should be affirmed.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _3__ day of December, 2019.
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP
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